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ABSTRACT 
This paper compiles the available information on historic tailings dam failures with the 
purpose to establish simple correlations between tailings ponds geometric parameters 
(e.g. dam height, tailings volume) and the hydraulic characteristics of floods resulting 
from released tailings. Following the collapse of a mining waste dam, only a part of 
tailings and polluted water stored at the dam is released, and this outflow volume is 
difficult to estimate prior the incident. In this study, tailings’ volume stored at the time 
of failure was shown to have a good correlation (r2 = 0.86) with the tailings outflow 
volume, and the volume of spilled tailings was correlated with its run-out distance (r2 = 
0.57). An envelope curve was drawn encompassing the majority of data points 
indicating the potential maximum downstream distance affected by a tailings’ spill. The 
application of the described regression equations for prediction purposes needs to be 
treated with caution and with support of on-site measurement and observations. 
However, they may provide a universal baseline approximation on tailing outflow 
characteristics (even if detailed dam information is unavailable), which is of a great 
importance for risk analysis purposes.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Dams are structural barriers built mainly for water management (for example irrigation, 
hydroelectric power and/or flood control) or the storage of industrial and mineral 
processing waste. Tailings dams are a particular type of dam built to store mill and 
waste tailings from mining activities. Currently, thousands of tailings dams worldwide 
contain billions of tonnes of waste material from mineral processing activity at mine 
sites. A number of particular characteristics make tailings dams more vulnerable to 
failure than water storage dams, namely: (1) embankments formed by locally derived 
fills (soil, coarse waste, overburden from mining operations and tailings); (2) multi-
stage raising of the dam to cope with the increase in solid material stored and effluent 
(plus runoff from precipitation) released; (3) the lack of regulations on specific design 
criteria; (4) dam stability requiring a continuous monitoring and control during 
emplacement, construction and operation of the dam; and (5) the high cost of 
remediation works following the closure of mining activities.    
 
Ever since the earliest dams were built, there have been dam failures.  However, most 
studies of dam-break floods have focused on water-storage dams, with only a few 
exceptions [1,2,3,4]. Tailings dam failures result from a variety of causal mechanisms 
(e.g. flooding, piping, overtopping, liquefaction, or a combination of several) spilling 
out polluted water and tailings with a variety of textural and physical-chemical 
properties, which may impact over the downstream socio-economic activities and 
ecological systems. A good example of the high socio-economic cost associated with 
tailings dam disasters is the Los Frailes (Aznalcollar) accident, a large scale sulphide 
tailings pond spill that occurred in April 1998, with ca. €152 million in socio-economic 
losses [5,6,7]. About €147 million was spent to correct the negative environmental and 
agricultural impacts, including restoration of the area’s natural resources (average 
impact of 5.7x106 €/km2) and ca. €5 million was dedicated to mitigate socio-economic 
and socio-labour impacts in the affected municipalities. In addition, uncountable 
impacts affected the region’s production structure which produced a drop in sales from 
milk producers, farmers and fish industries. 
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To date, most numerical models for dam break analysis have been developed for water-
storage dams. The purpose of these models has been to predict the flood characteristics 
(flood hydrograph, peak discharge, flood wave propagation time, etc.), this depending 
upon dam type (for example, earth, rockfill, concrete gravity, concrete arch etc), break 
mechanisms and breach size. A great effort is still needed, however, to establish a 
reliable general methodology for coping with hazard prediction from tailings dam 
failures, which may serve to classify tailings ponds according to their potential 
downstream damages. In tailings dam accidents, flow numerical models need to account 
for high sediment concentration floods. Jeyapaland et al. [2] applied a Bingham plastic 
model (TFLOW computer program) both for the Aberfan case and the Gypsum Tailings 
Dam incident (case 12 in Table 1) showing laminar flow behaviour of the tailings flood.   
Apart from complex hydraulic calculations applied to specific case studies, more simple 
estimations can be performed based on generic empirical relationships. In these 
equations, key hydrological parameters associated with dam failures (e.g. outflow 
volume, peak discharge, mine waste run-out distance) can be estimated from pre-failure 
physical characteristics of the dam (dam height, reservoir volume, etc.), based on 
reported historic dam failures. This approach has been successfully applied to estimate 
peak discharge and flood volume resulting from water-retention dam failures [8,9,10]. 
With tailings dams, empirical relationships are very limited probably due to the scarcity 
of reliable historical data. Lucia et al. [11] proposed a method to estimate the potential 
mine waste run-out distance (at slopes < 4º), based on historical tailings dam failures 
and using the value of the residual strength of liquefied tailings. Although these are 
based on simple empirical equations, the model requires some detailed geotechnical 
data of the material contained in the tailings ponds as well as on the geometry of the 
downstream valley, which are not always available or provided by the mining 
companies.  
 
The aim of this paper is to propose a set of simple empirical equations, to describe 
tailings pond characteristics and outflow hydraulic behaviour, based on data from 
historic dam failures. Although accuracy of these estimations should be approached 
with great caution, the equations provide a first and universal way for simple 
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estimations on potential risk and impact related to tailings dam breaks, using basic 
physical dam information.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
Several investigations have attempted to summarise the causes of major tailings dam 
failures throughout the world. The most recent and main synthesis was by ICOLD [12] 
(221 tailings dam incidents), based on the previous database by USCOLD [13], which 
collected a large amount of information on incidents in the USA (185 tailings dam 
incidents) that occurred during the period 1917-1989. This database has been 
supplemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [14] with recent mining 
and mineral processing damage cases in the USA and the United Nations 
Environmental Programme [15] (last updated 4 Mar 2006) in which a selection of 83 
major tailings dam failures was compiled. The analysis of tailings dam performance 
provides important knowledge on key design factors on dam stability [12], including on 
site characteristics (geology, seismicity, climate, upstream catchment area), selection of 
embankment and construction sequence type, as well as hazard assessment (heavy rain, 
flooding, earthquake). Empirical models of dam failure impact and tailings outflow 
movement are more difficult to establish in a universal way due to the severe lack of 
reliable data from previous incidents and high levels of complexity on dam break 
mechanisms, breach size, water-tailings concentration and spilled volume.  
 
The e-EcoRisk database (e-EcoRisk – A Regional Enterprise Network Decision-Support 
System for Environmental Risk and Disaster Management of Large-Scale Industrial 
Spills) was fed with the information mentioned above, after a process of revision, cross-
checking and updating of the data using existing bibliographic sources. During this 
process, a detailed literature review was conducted to gather as much information on 
tailings dam failures as possible. New data were added and information gaps were 
completed using different data sources such as journals, conference proceedings, 
reports, published and unpublished dissertations and web pages [2,3,4,16,17,18,19,20, 
21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28, among others]. Data from one of the European dams were 
obtained by interview with one dam failure witness and mine worker. The compilation 
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of data from different European countries was achieved through the collaboration of the 
e-EcoRisk partners.  
 
The reports on tailings dam failures are incomplete and heavily biased. There is no 
(complete) worldwide database of all historical failures. This database is, therefore, a 
subset of the actual number of tailings dam incidents in the world. The majority of 
tailings dam incidents remain unreported, especially in developing countries. In cases 
where a known accident did occur it is often difficult to access basic information 
regarding the tailings dam and its condition prior to the incident (e.g. dam height, 
tailings storage volume, tailings thickness, water content, etc). To date, 250 cases of 
tailings dam failures in the world have been compiled. For each case, as much 
information as possible was sought and documented. In the majority of cases, the 
information obtained is scarce; therefore, only 28 accidents (Table 1) with complete 
information on tailings outflow volume and flood run-out distance have been used in the 
correlation analysis presented in this study.  
 
3. RESULTS 
In water-storage dams, sensitivity studies have indicated that reservoir volume as well 
as dam height are critical factors in the magnitude of dam failure hydrographs [9,29]. 
The simplest proposed relations involve those two parameters, considering that most of 
the water volume stored at the reservoir was released. In the case of tailings ponds, the 
tailings outflow volume from dam incidents depends on the liquefaction process, break 
time, breach size and the amount of water content in the pond at the failure time. In 
most failure cases, tailings ponds are never emptied and, indeed, only a limited portion 
of the mine waste is released (see Table 1). Tailings outflow volume seems a more 
appropriate means to establish correlations with flood related parameters instead of 
reservoir volume. In tailings ponds, the height difference between the crest of the dam 
and the decant surface, known as freeboard, is rather small, and essentially the dam 
height equals the thickness of the tailings deposit. Accordingly, dam height provides a 
good approximation of the tailings thickness and its potential energy during the dam 
failure.   
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 In Fig. 1, a plot of dam height (H) of the known historical tailings dam failures versus 
the outflow run-out distance (Dmax) is shown. The graph shows a great dispersion of 
data and a poor relationship between these variables, described by the following 
regression equation:  
 
413.1
max 0528.0 HD ×=       Eq. 1 16.02 =r
 
The envelope curve for run-out distance from all the tailings dams has the equation:  
 
23.3
max 008.0 HD ×=         Eq. 2 
 
This poor correlation shows that run-out distance depends on other factors not 
considered in the equation, such as outflow mine waste volume, gradient and 
topography to which tailings flood debouches.  
 
A better relationship was obtained using mine waste outflow volume (VF), as the 
independent variable (note that VF includes tailings and water); although great data 
dispersion is still present (Fig. 2). A plot of these variables encompassing all the data 
points from Table 1 except case 8 (Churchrock, USA) provided the following regression 
equation: 
  
756.0
max 445.14 FVD ×=        Eq. 3 56.02 =r
 
with a standard error (SE) of 0.62%. The envelope curve obtained for this data set 
follows the equation: 
  
81.0
max 61.112 FVD ×=         Eq. 4 
 
Data dispersion may be explained by the water content at the decant pond at the time of 
failure, the water/tailings ratio at the run-out flood, as well as the drainage slope.  
 
The Churckrock dam (case 8) was an earthfill dam type located at a uranium mine. A 
major difference with other tailings dams is that the Churckrock dam retained only clear 
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water and the outflow peak following the failure moved downstream a larger distance in 
relation to the dam height and outflow volume than conventional tailings dam failures. 
This indicates that this spill behaved in the manner of a water-storage dam failure and, 
accordingly, it was neither used in the regression equations (Eq. 3 and Eq. 5) nor on the 
envelope curves (Eq. 4 and Eq. 6). Other historic mine waste dam failures referred to in 
bibliographic sources as water-storage dams (WR in Table 1) at mine complexes have 
been marked on the different plots. These cases include dams from Cities Services 
(USA), Ollinghouse (USA) and Omai (Guyana) (cases 9, 21 and 22 in Table 1). 
Contrary to the Churchrock dam, these examples did contain tailings and so these case 
studies were included in Fig. 2.  
 
In Fig. 1 (outflow run-out distance vs dam height) tailings ponds of water retention type 
(incident cases 8, 9, 21, 22 in Table 1) or containing a large volume of water at the 
failure time (incident cases 2, 5) are plotted close to the envelope curve, whereas those 
tailings ponds with lower water content plot in the lower part of the graph (incident 
cases 1, 13, 20, 25, 27 in Table 1). In Fig. 2 (outflow run-out distance vs mine waste 
outflow volume) data points are represented around a regression line which separate two 
data groups: (1) below the regression line data points correspond to incidents with a 
shorter tailings outflow run-out distance, and (2) above the line comprise those cases 
with a longer downstream dispersion of tailings outflow. The first group includes 
incidents with a high viscosity of the spilled mine waste (cases 3, 12, 13); a limitation 
on the tailings extent due to obstacles, topographic restrictions and barriers (cases 1, 23, 
25); and those with very low slope gradient downstream of the pond. This is the case of 
Gypsum Tailings Dam (case 12) emplaced over a flat surface, containing non-plastic silt 
tailings with an average field water of about 30 percent [2]. In the case of Merriespruit 
dam, South Africa (case 18), a tailings spill of wet materials travelled 2 km before being 
halted and contained by an ornamental lake [30]. Other examples of a tailings release 
with short run-out distance is the Stancil dam (USA, case 25) where the tailings 
flowslide was blocked at a creek near the embankment toe [12].  
The second cluster of data points (above regression line in Fig. 2) comprises those waste 
ponds which stored a larger volume of water with the tailings as well as those failures 
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related to heavy rains and dam overtopping (cases 5, 14, 15, 17 in Table 1). Some 
examples includes La Patagua New Dam (case 15) and Los Maquis (case 17), both in 
Chile, where water contents of the tailings reached 70 and 85%, respectively [19]. A 
different case is incident 28 (Unidentified, USA; Table 1) in which an anomalous 
tailings outflow volume (about one-third of the impoundment volume [12]) was 
reported, which apparently was not related to the large water volume stored behind the 
dam.  
Hagen [9] and the Committee on the Safety of Existing Dams [31] developed a criteria 
for water-storage dams to estimate peak discharge based upon the product of the dam 
height (H) and reservoir volume (V), also known as dam factor (H x V). This factor is a 
crude index of the energy expenditure at the dam when it fails [10].  In most of the 
tailings dam incidents only a part of the pond volume was released, which is a major 
difference in behaviour with water-storage dam accidents. Therefore for tailings dams a 
better relationship was found when dam factor was based upon the tailings spilled 
volume (VF). In Fig. 3, a plot of a “tailings dam” factor (H x VF) versus the outflow run-
out distance (Dmax) is shown. The regression line including all the data except case 8 
(Fig. 3) is the following: 
655.0
max )(612.1 FHVD ×=        Eq. 5 57.02 =r
 
where H is dam height in meters and VF is waste outflow volume in 106 x m3.  
An envelope curve encompassing all the historical tailings dam failures except case 8 
has the equation:  
 
79.0
max )(46.12 FHVD ×=         Eq. 6 
 
A major limitation to the application of this equation to risk analysis of standing tailings 
dams consists of the uncertainty of potential tailings outflow volume (VF) in the case of 
failure. Another empirical relationship (Fig. 4) was found between the tailings storage 
volume and the tailings released at the incidents (using incident cases of Table 1), which 
has the equation  
 
 8
008.1354.0 TF VV ×=        Eq. 7 86.02 =r
 
The above equation shows, that in average, one third of the tailings and water at the 
decant pond is released during dam failures. The envelope curve represents the 
maximum tailings volume that can be released in the most extreme situation in which 
pond volume was emptied following the dam break, as is the case of water-storage dam 
accidents or those of industrial (diluted) waste ponds.  
 
Available historic data on peak discharges from failures of tailings dams are scarce. In 
this study only three cases have been found: (1) from Buffalo Creek (USA; case 5), with 
an estimated discharge of 1415 m3s-1 using the slope-area method [10]; (2) from Los 
Frailes (Spain; case 16), with a recorded discharge of 811 m3s-1, using a rating curve 
obtained for clear water at a gauge station located 11 km downstream of the tailings 
dam [32]; and (3) from McLauren gold Mine (USA) [33], with an associated discharge 
of ca. 200 m3s-1, estimated using the dam factor/discharge equation proposed by Costa 
[10].  
 
On the basis of historical water-storage (constructed and natural) dam breaks, Costa 
[10] proposed several empirical relationships obtained using dam height (H), water 
volume contained at the reservoir (V) and the resulting flood peak discharge (Q) when it 
failed (see Figs. 5 and 6). A major contribution of the Costa [10] paper is the analysis of 
floods from natural dams including ice dams (water impounded within or behind glacial 
ice), moraine dams, volcanic flow dams and landslide dams. Landslide dams typically 
involve large volumes of sediments producing wide abutments, which are partly eroded 
by water during dam overtopping and breaching [34]. According to Costa [10] this 
explains that flood peaks from failed landslide dams appear to be smaller than 
constructed dam failures with the same dam height and reservoir volume (Figs. 5 and 
6). Similarly, when a tailings dam is overtopped by runoff excess from the drainage 
basin, there is commonly large water content for tailings sediment before a full breach is 
developed which would be added to the tailings outflow volume. A tailings flood is 
commonly composed of water with high sediment concentration which provides a wide 
 9
range of fluid behavior from debris flow to muddy floodwater. This wide range of flow 
behavior is reflected in the representation of the few available historical data points 
(Fig. 5 and 6), which corresponds to Buffalo Creek (case 5) and Los Frailes (case 16). 
On the one hand, Buffalo Creek dam incident plots on the regression line corresponding 
to water-storage dams due to a dam failure caused by flow overtopping in relation to 
extreme rainfall. The run-out flood contained a mixture of water and carbon residua 
with a turbulent flow behavior [2], which indeed plots on the regression line of incidents 
related to constructed earthfill dams for water-storage. Regarding Los Frailes tailings 
dam incident, it was released a high viscous flow containing a large proportion of 
tailings. The mine waste flood discharge was recorded at a gauge station located 11 km 
downstream of the tailings dam. The hydrograph shape comprised two peaks, with the 
first one reaching 811 m3s-1 and a second one of 294 m3s-1, according to a rating curve 
calibrated for water flow, which probably overestimated the mine waste discharge due 
to its higher viscosity [32]. The first hydrograph peak was composed of a water-
dominant flow, mainly from the upper water-laid layer at the reservoir, whereas the 
second contained a high tailings load in a high viscosity flow (Fig. 7). As shown in Fig. 
5, Los Frailes tailings dam incident (case 16) plots on the regression line obtained from 
historical failures of landslide dams after Costa [10]. The discharge estimation from the 
landslide dam failure equation is 1189 m3s-1, which is a similar order of magnitude to 
the the 811 m3s-1 recorded at the gauge station for the first hydrograph peak [32].  
 
Fig. 6 shows the empirical relationship between dam factor and peak discharge of 
historical dam failures of constructed and natural dams by Costa [10], in which dam 
factor (H x V) for Los Frailes tailings dam failure was plotted using both the total 
tailings volume stored at the decant pond (case 16 point 2) and the outflow volume 
(case 16 point 1). It is shown that for tailings dam failures more robust results are 
obtained considering the spilled tailings volume than the ones applying the total tailings 
volume contained at the reservoir when dam failed.  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
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In this paper, empirical relationships of mine decant pond geometric characteristics with 
hydrologic parameters of floods from mine waste spills from historic dam failures were 
obtained. These relationships provide a first approximation to estimate the tailings 
outflow volume and the mine waste run-out distance from a dam failure, although these 
assessments may contain large uncertainties considering the high standard errors of the 
regression equations. These errors result from a large variety of parameters affecting the 
mine waste flow, including sediment load, fluid behavior (Newtonian or Bingham-
plastic) which depends on the type of failure (e.g. seismic action, static liquefaction, 
slide, etc), particle-dependent rheology of the suspension, topography and valley 
gradient and presence of obstacles impeding the slurry to flow among others. Other 
source of uncertainty is related to the lack of data related with the water volume existing 
at the time of failure either stored at the decant pond or linked to the meteorological 
causes triggering the dam failure (intense rainfall, hurricanes, rapid snowmelt, ice 
accumulation in the tailings dam, etc), which may change indeed the hydrologic 
conditions (peak discharge, tailings outflow volume) and the run-out distance of the 
tailings. Those conditions are site and event specific and therefore difficult to be 
considered by empirical relationships.   
 
These uncertainties may be reduced considering the most similar case in the historical 
database. This analysis can also be used as a deterministic tool to provide information 
on the largest peak discharge and/or potential distance of the tailings flood by using the 
proposed envelope curves. Note that even in this case, a greater distance may be reached 
if the released tailings is mixed and diluted within a river water flow, as happened in 
various historical tailings dam incidents. In spite of the described limitations, the 
method provides preliminary data on the tailings outflow hydraulic characteristics using 
basic available tailings dam and embankment parameters, which may be used, for 
instance, to classify the failure risk associated to a large population of tailings dams. 
 
These equations were applied on two case studies of the e-Ecorisk project (Table 2): (1) 
Los Frailes dam (Aznalcollar, Spain, case 16, Table 1) which failed in April, 1998; and 
(2) the inactive Ashes Dam at the Almagrera mine (Spain), an example of an un-
breached tailings dam.On 25 April 1998, the rupture of the dam containing the tailings 
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reservoir of the pyrite mine of Aznalcóllar caused a spill of 4.5 x 106 m3 of acid water 
and pyrite ore. The resulting mine waste, containing high concentrations of heavy 
metals (mean particle size 12 µm), was of a solid content of some 0.88 x 106 m3 and 
2.97 x 103 Mg mass [6]. The accident provoked the inundation of the floodplains of the 
rivers Agrio and Guadiamar (average stream gradient of 0.00146) and was close to 
affecting the Guadalquivir marshlands posing a substantial threat to the ecosystems of 
the Doñana Natural and National Parks. The tailings flood led to the sedimentation of 
pyrite contaminated waste [35, 36] along the floodplain of the Agrio- Guadiamar 
system, covering 2616 ha from the failed dam to the start of the Guadalquivir 
marshlands. Heavy metal pollution (zinc, lead, and cadmium among others; [37]) 
mostly affected the superficial soil layers (0–20 cm), although in some coarser soils 
pollution may penetrate down to at least 50–80 cm [38].  
 
The empirical regression equations proposed in this study provide an estimation of mine 
waste outflow volume ranging between 5.4-7.3 x 106 m3 (from equation 7; Table 3), 
whereas the actual Aznalcollar incident released 4.6 x 106 m3 which includes acid water 
and pyrite ore. The mine waste run-out distance estimated from equation 5 ranges 
between 42 and 51 km (Table 3). The actual run-out distance downstream of the 
Guadiamar river was between 40 and 45 km (according to Antón-Pacheco et al. [39]), 
which is similar to the empirically estimated tailings outflow travel distance.  
 
The Almagrera mine, the second test case, is within the same metalogenetic province 
and mining context of the Aznalcollar mines. At the Almagrera mine, the ashes dam is 
34.5 m in height with an actual tailings volume of 2.8 x 106 m3, although it was 
designed to store about 3.2 x 106 m3 of milled waste [40]. In the case of dam failure, the 
proposed empirical regression lines show an estimated run-out distance between 16 and 
32 km (Table 3) for present conditions (volume stored of 2.8 x 106 m3). The Almagrera 
dam is connected with a tributary stream which joins the Odiel River (stream gradient 
0.00154) ca. 3.5 km downstream. According to this estimated run-out distance, the 
tailings waste may reach the Odiel River and pollutants can be dispersed by the river’s 
stream flow, in a similar way to the Aznacollar incident. 
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The proposed equations should be considered as a first approach in tailings dam risk 
studies, but more precise deterministic models are required to provide precise site by 
site tailings flood impacts. Errors may be large on extreme cases either for tailings dam 
containing high water volume, or for hyperconcentrated flows. Obstacles or barriers 
along the slurry pathway should also be considered. On the positive side, there is a lack 
of detailed data on most of the existing tailings dams of the world. In addition, for 
operative tailings dams is not possible to anticipate the volume of water that may be 
involved or the thickness of the tailings contained at the decant pond at time of failure.  
In those cases, basic dam information (dam height and volume), which can be obtained 
from national dam databases or by remote sensing analysis, may provide preliminary 
data to assess potential risk to downstream socio-economic activities and environmental 
impacts. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Dam failure impact depends on the tailings outflow travel distance and path, and on the 
exposure and vulnerability of goods, population, land use, water use and environmental 
values of the natural areas located downstream. The diversity of the tailings dam 
characteristics (dam type, dam situation, type of sequentially raised tailing dam, dam 
foundation, dam fill material, state of activity, storage volume, tailings dam height, 
tailings’ density and pond water volume, among others), make any universal prediction 
assessing dam failure impacts very speculative. In addition, detailed risk assessments 
involve timely and costly geotechnical, hydrological and hydraulic studies which can 
only be completed with either or both the complicity of mining companies and political 
authorities.  
 
In this study, a worldwide database of historic failures was collected from which a 
regression analysis was carried out in order to establish relationships and trends. The 
resulting empirical correlations among physical parameters (namely dam height and 
pond volume) of the tailings reservoir and tailings flood characteristics can be applied to 
provide a first estimate on the volume of tailings spills, tailings run-out distance and, 
with the appropriate measurements and observations, even to assess the outflow peak 
discharge.  In these relationships, two possible solutions have been provided: (1) a 
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conservative estimation based on the regression equations of the historic tailings dam 
failures; and (2) the worst case scenario estimation based on the envelope curves 
developed from historic dam failures from tailings dams and water retention dams.  
 
Tailings outflow volume from a dam failure can be reasonably estimated if total tailings 
pond volume is known. Then, the estimated tailings spill can be used in combination 
with the dam factor (height and volume) and the pond’s tailings volume for prediction 
purposes on the estimation of run-out distance of standing dams. Two case studies 
included in the European Commission e-Ecorisk project, namely the Los Frailes 
(Aznalcollar) historic dam failure and the standing tailings dam at Almagrera (Ashes 
dam) complex have been discussed in view of the results provided by the proposed 
regression equations. It is evident that the results need to be treated with caution, due to 
the uncertainty present in documentary evidence and the diversity of the tailings dams. 
However, the estimates obtained for the Aznacollar dam failure provided similar values 
in terms of tailings outflow volume and run-out distance to the field observations. In 
summary, the proposed regression equations provide a first approach to assess some risk 
parameters at dams with a lack of information or prior to further detailed studies.  
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 Table 1.  Historical tailings dam failures used in the correlation analysis. Legend: 
RING: Ring dyke; WR: Water Retention; UPS: Dams subsequently raised upstream; 
MXSQ: Dam comprising different raising typology (upstream, centreline and 
downstream); H: Dam height; VF: Volume of tailings released. 
Ref. 
Nº. Name of the Dam 
Date of 
failure 
Type of 
dam 
Dam 
Height
Impoudment 
volume 
Run-out 
Distance 
Dam 
Factor 
Released 
Volume 
   (year)   (m) (x106 m3) (km) (HxVF) (x106 m3)
1 Arcturus (Zimbawe ) 1978 RING 25 1.7-2.0 Mt 0.3 0.5 0.0211 
2 Bafokeng (South Africa) 1974 RING 20 13 45 60 3 
3 Baia Mare (Romania) 2000 UPS 7 0.8 0.18 0.7 0.1 
4 Bellavista (Chile) 1965 RING 20 0.45 0.8 1.4 0.07 
5 Buffalo Creek (USA) 1972 UPS 14-18 0.5 64.4 7-9 0.5 
6 Cerro Negro No.3 (Chile) 1965 UPS 20 0.5 5 1.7 0.085 
7 Cerro Negro No.4 (Chile) 1985 MXSQ 40 2 8 20 0.5 
8 Churchrock (USA) 1979 WR 11 0.37 
96.5-
112.6 4.07 0.37 
9 Cities Service (USA) 1971 WR 15 12.34 120 135 9 
10 El Cobre Old Dam (Chile) 1965 UPS 35 4.25 12 66.5 1.9 
11 Galena Mine (USA) 1974 UPS 9  0.61 0.034 0.0038 
12 
Gypsum Tailings Dam 
(USA) 1966 UPS 11 7 Mt 0.3 
0.88-
1.43 2 x105t 
13 Hokkaido (Japan) 1968 UPS 12 0.3 0.15 1.08 0.09 
14 Itabirito (Brazil) 1986 Gravity 30  12 3 0.1 
15 La Patagua New Dam (Chile) 1965 RING 15  5 0.525 0.035 
16 Los Frailes (Spain) 1998 RING 27 15-20 41 53.51 4.6 
17 Los Maquis (Chile) 1965 UPS 15 0.043 5 0.315 0.021 
18 Merriespruit (South Africa) 1994 RING 31 7.04 2 18.6 2.5 Mt 
19 Mochikoshi No.1 (Japan) 1978 UPS 28 0.48 8 2.24 0.08 
20 Mochikoshi No.2 (Japan) 1978 UPS 19  0.15 0.057 0.003 
21 Ollinghouse (USA) 1985 WR 5 0.12 1.5 0.125 0.025 
22 Omai (Guyana) 1995 WR 44 5.25 80 184.8 4.2 
23 Phelps-Dodge (USA) 1980 UPS 66 2.5 8 132 2 
24 Sgurigrad (Bulgaria) 1966 UPS 45 1.52 6 9.9 0.22 
25 Stancil (USA) 1989 UPS 9 0.074 0.1 0.342 0.038 
26 Stava (Italy) 1985 RING 29.5 0.3 4.2 5.605 0.19 
27 Tapo Canyon (USA) 1994 UPS 24  0.18   
28 Unidentified (USA) 1973 UPS 43 0.5 25 7.31 0.17 
29 Veta del Agua Nº1 (Chile) 1985 MXSQ 24 0.7 5 6.72 0.28 
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Table 2. Tailings dam characteristics of the selected examples, and channel slope of the major 
river connected to the tailings pond. 
Dam name Dam Height 
Tailings 
volume at 
decant pond 
Average 
slope 
downstream 
 (m) (x106 m3) m m-1
Los Frailes Dam (Spain) 27 15-20 0.00146 
Almagrera Ashes Dam (Spain) 34.5 2.8 0.00154 
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Table 3. Tailings volume for different dams, and observed spilled volume and distance run-out 
of tailings in relation to the Los Frailes (Aznalcollar) dam incident. VT: Total tailings volume at 
dam. VF: Tailings outflow volume; D: Run-out distance of tailings following dam breach. 
Tailings outflow volume and pollutant run-out distance were estimated using equations 7 and 5. 
*Note that tailings spill volume includes acid water and pyrite ore. 
 
VT 
(x106 m3) 
VF
observed 
(x106 m3) 
VF’ from 
eq.7  
(x106 m3) 
D 
observed 
(km) 
D (km) estimated 
from eq. 5 using : 
Dam name     VT VF’ 
Los Frailes Dam (case nº 
16 in Table 1) 15-20 4.6* 5.4-7.3 41 82-99 42-51 
Almagrera Ashes Dam  2.8  1  32 16 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Figure 1. Graph showing the dam height (H in metres) at time of failure, versus the run-out 
distance of tailings following dam breach (Dmax in km) for the historical failure cases, with 
numbers keyed to Table 1. 
 
Figure 2. Graph showing the tailings outflow volume due to tailings dam incidents (VF, in 
millions of cubic metres) versus the run-out distance of tailings from historical failure cases 
(Dmax in km), with numbers referred in Table 1. 
 
Figure 3. Graph showing “tailings dam” factor (H x VF; H in metres and VF in 106 x m3) versus 
run-out distance of tailings (Dmax in km) for the historical failure cases, with numbers keyed to 
Table 1. 
 
Figure 4. Graph showing the tailings outflow volume from the tailings dam (VF in 106 x m3) 
versus the volume of tailings stored at the dam (VT in 106 x m3) at the time of the incident.  
 
Figure 5. Graph the dam height (H in metres) at time of failure, versus peak discharge (m3s-1) 
for constructed and landslide dams (dates from Costa [10]) and tailings dams (case 5: Buffalo 
Creek, USA; case 16: Los Frailes, Aznalcollar, Spain).  
 
Figure 6. Graph the dam factor (H x V) versus peak discharge (m3s-1) for constructed and 
landslide dams (data from Costa [10]) and tailings dams (Case 5: Buffalo Creek, USA; Case 16: 
Los Frailes, Aznalcollar, Spain. (numbers keyed to Table 1). Dam factor (H x V) for Los 
Frailes was plotted using both the total tailings volume at decant pond (case 16 point 2) 
and the tailings outflow volume (case 16 point 1). In the Aznacollar incident, a 
discharge-dam factor relationship similar to landslide dams is obtained from a dam 
factor calculated from the spilled tailings volume instead of the total dam tailings 
volume which is used on water-retention dam failures relationships.  
 
Figure 7. Slurry flood hydrograph of the Aznacollar spill in the El Guijo gauge station, 
11 km downstream of the Los Frailes tailings dam, in the Guadiamar river. The 
hydrograph comprises two peaks related to a first water pulse and a second tailings 
flow. (after Ayala-Carcedo [32]). 
 
 22







